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BEYOND LANE: WHO IS PROTECTED BY THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, WHO SHOULD BE?
RUSSELL POWELLt
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Americans with Disabilities Act' (the "Act" or the
"ADA") was enacted in 1990, many disability rights advocates expected
that it would usher in a new era of equal opportunity and acceptance for
people with disabilities.2 Written in the tradition of both the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 19733 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 the ADA reflected
the ideal of distributive justice in its mandate to both counter discrimina-
tion and provide accommodation;5 however, the courts gradually nar-
6rowed its coverage. Some empirical studies assert that the ADA actu-
ally caused a decline in the rate of employment among people with dis-
abilities. By early 2000, some scholars predicted that the ADA would
fade into obscurity as an ill-conceived relic that failed to adequately an-
ticipate social costs and the rational choices of employers and people
with disabilities.8
However, the ADA received new vigor from the Supreme Court
with the May 2004 opinion, Tennessee v. Lane.9 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court affirmed that Congress validly exercised its power when it sub-
jected states to suits under the ADA, at least with regard to limitations on
access to courts.' 0 While the decision addresses Title II of the ADA," it
does have broader implications for the Act as a whole. Lane reflects a
t Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, visiting at Santa Clara
University School of Law. AB 1988, Harvard College; J.D. 1996, University of Virginia School of
Law; M.A. 2001, Loyola University of Chicago. Member of the New York, California, and District
of Columbia bars. I would like to thank David Ingram, Jennifer Parks and Marcus Kosins for their
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this piece. I would also like to thank Nicole
Aeschleman for her comments and research assistance.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Introduction to AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS xiii, xix (Leslie
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds. 2000) [hereinafter Francis & Silvers].
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794 (2000).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 7000e (2004).
5. S. REP. No. 101-16, at 2 (1989).
6. James Leonard, Symposium: The American with Disabilities Act: A Ten-Year Retrospec-
tive: The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-
Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 91-92 (2000).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Regulation, 2000, Vol. 23, No. 1 at 24.
9. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
10. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.
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significant shift in the ethical paradigm used by the Court to decide ADA
cases and creates the opportunity to re-open dialogue about the real pol-
icy goals of the ADA and broader questions of justice for those with dis-
abilities. Analysis of the measurable impact of the ADA continues and
results in sometimes conflicting assertions. But whatever conclusions are
ultimately proven, the question of our policy goals and our conception of
justice for people with disabilities must be distinguished from the judicial
and legislative tools intended to achieve those goals.
The ADA's legislative history makes it clear that it was intended to
address the social issues associated with discrimination as well as acces-
sibility issues for those with physical impairments. 12  The Supreme
Court's emphasis on impairment and the notion of a discrete and insular
minority found in civil rights legislation has transformed the scope of the
ADA found in its plain meaning. The result is that some claimants who
fall within the intended and literal scope of the ADA do not receive the
benefit of its protection.' 3  Furthermore, states have largely been ex-
empted from the requirements of the ADA,14 Lane notwithstanding.
Under Title I (the ADA's employment provisions), 15 even those
who can make a successful claim may be caught in the catch-22 of win-
ning a case but being terminated because their impairment makes them
unemployable.1 6  Although those who care for the disabled are not ex-
pressly covered by any part of the ADA, it is arguable that they consti-
tute a vulnerable class which should receive fair compensation and per-
haps legal protections under the ADA (though admittedly this might be
more appropriately addressed under a different legislative aegis). 7 For
these reasons, this paper recommends a reconsideration of the ADA's
goals and a review of its effectiveness. While such a project is broader
than the scope of this paper, its ultimate conclusions may necessitate
changes in disability policy and justify substantial amendments to the
ADA which would better-serve the original legislative intent and the
interests of the disabled.
Part II of this article comments on the scope of the ADA in its statu-
tory language, its legislative history, the regulations intended to provide
clarification and the history of major Supreme Court decisions interpret-
ing it. Part I reflects on the philosophical paradigms that appear to be
12. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the ADA, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 387, 387-89
(1991) [hereinafter Weicker].
13. Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining "Disability" Discrimination: A Pro-
posal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for Al! Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 321, 321-22
(2003) [hereinafter Center & Imparato].
14. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2004).
16. Ronald Turner, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Workplace: A Study of the
Supreme Court's Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SUtRv. AM. L. 379, 409 (2004).
17. Mary Mahowald, A Feminist Standpoint, in DISABILITY, DEFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION,
209, 239-50 (Anita Silvers et. a]. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Mahowald].
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operative in the creation and interpretation of the ADA. The concerns
raised by some of the major empirical studies and recommended new
areas for research are addressed in Part IV. Part V comments on possible
revision of the ADA to create effective and legally valid incentives that
better achieve national justice goals.
II. SCOPE OF THE ADA
The scope of the ADA is not self-evident. The text of the statute
and its legislative history created high expectations.1 8  In general, the
regulations implementing the ADA reinforced these expectations. 19
However, the case law, particularly at the Supreme Court level, has cur-
tailed those expectations by narrowing the definition of disability and by
according state governments a significant degree of immunity.20
A. The Statute
The ADA is divided into five separate titles, four of which provide
rights of action.21 Title I contains employment antidiscrimination provi-
sions intended to protect the disabled. 2 Title I requires that state and
local governments provide all public programs, activities and services
without discriminating on the basis of disability.23 Title II prevents pri-
vate entities that provide public services from discriminating on the basis
of disability. 24 Title IV requires telecommunications companies to pro-
vide equipment and services for the hearing and speech impaired.25
Lastly, Title V contains miscellaneous interpretive provisions and dis-
pute resolution clauses.26
The ADA describes a disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the [individual's] major life ac-
tivities." 27 In theory, the protection of the ADA also extends to those
who are regarded as having a disability or who have a record of disabil-
ity.28  Although Title I protection should theoretically be extended in
18. Richard K. Scotch, Making Change: The ADA as an Instrument of Social Reform, in
AMERICANS WITH DSABILITIES: EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 275, 276 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds. 2000) [hereinafter Scotch].
19. See infra notes 41 and 50.
20. See Center and Imparato, supra note 13, at 324-29.
21. Americans with Disabilities Act, §§ 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2004).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2004).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2004).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2004).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2004).
27. The Americans with Disabilities Act, § 3(2)(A) (1990) [hereinafter ADA]. Quoting all of
Section 3(2), "Disability-The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." Id. at §3(2)(A)-(C).
28. Id. at § 3(2)(B) & (C). These sections clearly address the issue of discrimination as dis-
tinct from impairment. Those who have a record of disability would include disabled persons who
no longer have a disability, but who still suffer from discrimination. For example, someone who
2004]
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these cases according to the language of the statute, it has not been due to
the narrow definition of disability used by the Supreme Court.29  The
legislative history of the ADA refers to 43 million as the hypothetical
number of Americans living with disabilities in 1990.30 In an effort to
limit the scope of the ADA by including no more than that estimated 43
million people, the Court has required proof of severe physical or mental
impairment, usually construed as a specific medical disorder, whether
caused by genetics, injury or disease.3'
B. Legislative History
Historically, the ADA is the logical extension of the protections of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.32 Where the Rehabilitation Act
only protected against discrimination by groups receiving federal fund-
ing,33 Title I of the ADA applies in theory to nearly all private and state
entities. Disability rights groups lobbied extensively for these protec-
tions in the 1988 presidential race.34
To fulfill expectations for new and more expansive disability anti-
discrimination protection, a joint hearing was held before the Senate
Subcommittee on Disability Policy and the House Subcommittee on Se-
lect Education in September 1988. 35 Many people with disabilities testi-
fied before the overflowing room about architectural and communication
barriers and the pervasiveness of stereotyping and prejudice.36 Senator
Kennedy, Chair of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, Senator
Harkin, Chair of the Subcommittee on Disability Policy, and Representa-
tive Owens of the House Subcommittee on Select Education committed
themselves to passing a comprehensive disability civil rights bill.37 Over
the following two years, a significant body of testimony and statistics
was presented to Congress and became a part of the legislative record of
the ADA. While the legislative record strongly indicates Congressional
suffered from a disabling disease that has been cured, may still suffer discrimination as a person who
had a stigmatizing disease. Similarly, someone may suffer discrimination for being perceived as
disabled even if she is not. Also, someone may be discriminated against because she is believed to
suffer from a disabling disease, even if she does not.
29. See Center and Imparato, supra note 13, at 324-29.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2004).
31. This is a reference to the so-called "medical model" of disability. See Elizabeth A. Pendo,
Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1214 (2002) [hereinafter Pendo I]; See generally Joel Feinberg, Disability
and Illness, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 244 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge
2000) (challenging the alleged objectivity of medical diagnoses as a basis for demonstrating disabil-
ity discrimination) [hereinafter Feinberg].
32. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701,794.
33. 29 USC § 794(a) (2004).
34. Francis & Silvers, supra note 2, at xix.
35. Weicker, supra note 12, at 391.
36. Francis & Silvers, supra note 2, at xix.
37. Weicker, supra note 12, at 391.
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intent for broad protections, 38 the Supreme Court has largely ignored it.
39
Extensive references to the legislative history of the ADA in Lane indi-
cate that such evidence of Congressional findings and intent are once
again significant."
m
C. Regulations
Within one year of the ADA's passage, Congress authorized the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to issue regula-
tions implementing Title 1.41 The most important definitions proffered
are "physical or mental impairment, ',42 "substantially limits, ' 43 and "ma-
jor life activity."" However, both Sutton v. United Airlines45 and Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,46 further described below, convinc-
ingly call into question the validity of these regulations.47  Thus, while
they may be instructive, the EEOC regulations are today accorded little
deference. 48 As a result, the definition of "disability" is largely the prod-
uct of judicial opinions, and the assertion that a plaintiff is not a "quali-
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2004).
39. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). "[The dissent] relies on the legisla-
tive history of the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals should be examined in their
uncorrected state. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10-18 (2000). Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot
be read in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history." Id.
40. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1984-92.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2004).
42. Regulations To Implement The Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2004).
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, spe-
cial sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, di-
gestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id.
43. Id. at § 1630.20)(1) (2004).
The term substantially limits means: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular ma-
jor life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the aver-
age person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
Id.
44. Id. at § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2004). "Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing." Id.
45. See generally Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (discussing that
no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term "disability").
46. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (substituting a
more restrictive interpretation of "substantially limits" in place of the EEOC's definition of that
element).
47. Lisa Eichhom, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the
EEOC's "Disability" Regulations under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177, 180 (2004) [here-
inafter Eichhom].
48. fd.
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fled person with a disability" is the most common defense in ADA em-
ployment cases.
49
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") issued regulations implement-
ing Title H with the intention of harmonizing them with Title VII civil
rights regulations. 50 These regulations provide detailed standards for
state and local government compliance with the antidiscrimination provi-
sions of Title H."' Notably, they provide specific guidelines for access to
courtrooms, the very question posed by Lane52 discussed below.53
Since the definition of disability in the ADA was based on the
three-pronged definition in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (including
impairment, a record of impairment and being regarded as having an
impairment), courts have used regulations originally drafted by the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare implementing the Rehabilita-
tion Act to interpret terms in the ADA.54 These regulations, now under
the auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS"), are particularly important in defining "major life activities."
D. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The ADA has been limited in several ways. Most significantly, the
Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of ADA coverage by limiting the
definition of a qualified person with a "disability. 55 Congress clearly
intended to protect from discrimination those with epilepsy, diabetes,
mental health conditions, amputees and others who are able to mitigate
the effects of their impairment.56 However, claims on the basis of these
disabilities are "routinely dismissed as outside the protection of the stat-
ute." 57 Title I cases against states universally fail to overcome Eleventh
Amendment immunity although Tennessee v. Lane has notably upheld
Title II at least with regard to court access. 58 This is significant in that it
represents a trend toward judicially limiting the scope and protections of
the ADA.5 9 Presuming that the current Supreme Court will not radically
shift its position in favor of greater protection for the disabled, any real
change must originate in Congress, must provide measurable results and
49. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 303 (2000).
50. 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1979.
53. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 35.102, 35.104 (2004) (providing definitions for interpretation
of the ADA, which apply to all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by
public entities).
54. Eichhom, supra note 47, at 182-83.
55. Center & Imparato, supra note 13, at 322.
56. Id. at 321.
57. Id. at 322.
58. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1980-82 (2004).
59. Scotch, supra note 18, at 279.
[Vol. 82:1
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must be calculated to pass constitutional muster under the prevailing
precedents.
1. The First Cases
Many of the earlier ADA cases provided clarification and tended to
narrow the protections of the Act, creating a complex and often inconsis-
60tent set of rules. One of the great challenges facing the Supreme Court
in its ADA decisions has been reconciling the perceived need for clear
rules with the tragic circumstances faced by many ADA claimants.
Some of the first Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA
seemed to uphold the scope of the Act indicated by its text and legisla-
tive history. Bragdon v. Abbott asserted that an individual with H1V is
considered a person with a disability even in the beginning stages of the
disease.62 While somewhat controversial at the time, this result was
clearly intended by some in Congress. 63 Cleveland v. Policy Manage-
ment Systems Corporation64 declared that it is not a contradiction of
terms when an individual claims to be "totally disabled" in order to col-
lect Social Security Disability Insurance, and at the same time is able to
perform the essential functions of a job under the ADA. 65 However, this
rule has only been distinguished in reported federal cases, never fol-
lowed.66 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey 67 declared
that state prisons are state entities subject to the requirements of Title 11
of the ADA,68 and that entities operating as extensions of state power are
subject to Title I unless state immunity would apply.69
In 1999, there appeared to be a shift in Supreme Court decisions,
significantly narrowing the protections of the ADA.70  However,
Olmstead v. L. C.7 found that under Title II of the ADA it is appropriate
to place people with mental disabilities in community-based settings
when such placement is deemed appropriate by the state's treatment pro-
fessionals. 72 The Court required that the State of Georgia provide these
60. Center & linparato, supra note 13, at 325-26.
61. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
62. Id. at 637.
63. 136 Cong. Rec. S. 9684 (1990).
64. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
65. Id. at 798-99.
66. A Shepard's report was run using LEXIS on January 17, 2005.
67. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210.
68. Id. at 210.
69. Laurence Paradis, Symposium: Development in Disability Rights: Title 11 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services and
Activities Accessible to All, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 389, 395 (2003).
70. See infra notes 79, 80 and 81.
71. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
72. Id. at 607.
2004]
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alternatives to institutionalization so long as the costs remain reason-
able.73
There have been a few very narrow decisions that have upheld ADA
protection in highly disputed cases since 1999. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Mar-
tin74 was decided after Sutton and its sibling cases, but it reflects a more
expansive reading of the ADA. It required that the PGA allow Casey
Martin to ride in a golf cart rather than walk the course during PGA tour-
naments.75 The Court held that riding does not fundamentally alter the
nature of the game and must be allowed to accommodate the disabled
under Title 111.76 The ruling was so specific that it is unclear what sort of
fact patterns would be governed by this precedent."
Abbott, Policy Management Systems Corp., Yeskey, and Martin
generally indicate a desire by the Supreme Court to protect those they
perceive as being truly disadvantaged, a group that seems to be limited in
these later cases to those without the ability to see, hear or walk.78 How-
ever, the inconsistency in applying the original intent of Congress in en-
acting the ADA has created a patchwork of rules resulting in actual and
perceived inequity in the judicial treatment of different groups of dis-
abled people.
2. The Sutton Trio
Three related cases, Sutton v. United Airlines, 7 Murphy v. U.P.S. 0
and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg8 l(the "Sutton Trio"), decided on the
same day in 1999, further limited the protections afforded by the ADA.
Sutton v. United Airlines held that in order to determine if an individual
is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, it is important to take into
account any corrective measures the individual with the impairment em-
ploys.8 2 Therefore, individuals who are able to correct their vision to
20/20 or better with eyeglasses are not to be considered disabled.83 In a
similar manner, Murphy relied on Sutton to conclude that the petitioner's
high blood pressure could not be considered a disability when he was
taking medication that effectively controlled it. 84 Kirkinburg, the third
case of the Sutton Trio, concluded that cases questioning the existence of
73. Id. at 587.
74. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
75. Id. at 661-62.
76. Id. at 690.
77. David A. Monaghan, Title III of the ADA Allows a Qualified Disabled Entrant to Use a
Motorized Cart on the Professional Golf Tour: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 40 DUQ. L. REv. 403, 425
(2002).
78. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 195.
79. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
80. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
81. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
82. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
83. Id. at 481.
84. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
[Vol. 82:1
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a disability must be examined on a case-by-case basis regarding whether
an individual is impaired in any major life activities.85
There are two significant problems with these three decisions. First,
the Supreme Court has reinforced an "objective" medical standard for
disability.86 Second, "disabilities" that are correctable by device or
medication do not qualify as protected disabilities under the ADA.87
This rule was promulgated as a rejection of the claim that correctable
vision constitutes a protected disability. 88 Although Justice Scalia re-
jected the inclusion of correctable vision problems as overly broad,89
Justice Ginsburg took a more nuanced approach, noting that "[Plersons
whose uncorrected eyesight is poor, or who rely on daily medication for
their well-being, can be found in every social and economic class; they
do not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they coalesce as
historical victims of discrimination. ' 90
Thus the Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the ADA in
the context of its goal to protect the "disabled" as an insular minority
characterized by political and economic disadvantage.
3. Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams91
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, respondent Ella Wil-
liams claimed that her employer, Toyota, had violated Title I of the ADA
by not providing a reasonable accommodation for her claimed disability,
which included the inability to hold her arms at shoulder height for hours
at a time.92 Toyota successfully argued that the claimed disability only
prevented Ms. Williams from performing the sort of manual labor re-
quired for her job and would not constitute a substantial disability with
regard to a broad range of jobs.93  Significantly, the Court issued a
unanimous decision.94
The key question before the Court was whether the inability to per-
form manual tasks that are not necessarily encountered in daily living,
85. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 556.
86. See Pendo I, supra note 31, at 1214; David Wasserman, Stigma Without Impairment:
Demedicalizing Disability Discrimination, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 146, 149 (Leslie Pickering Francis
& Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000) [hereinafter Wasserman].
87. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
88. Id. at 487-88.
89. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 146.
Justice Scalia removed his glasses and waved them in the air. He was making the point
that if mitigation were ignored, he, along with millions of other Americans, would be
swept into the category of "disabled," swelling its ranks far beyond the 43 million recog-
nized by Congress when it adopted the statute ....
Id.
90. Id. at 147.
91. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
92. Id. at 189.
93. Id. at 200.
94. Id. at 184.
2004]
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but are required in some jobs, "substantially limits" a "major life activ-
ity." 95 If not, Ms. Williams could not be considered a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" for the purposes of the ADA.96 What is clear from
the opinion is that the Court presumptively considers substantial impair-
ments of the major life activities of walking, seeing and hearing as the
clearest indications that a person is qualified to make a disability claim
under Title 1. 97 In quoting the DHHS regulations for the Rehabilitation
Act defining "major life activities" which include such relevant catego-
ries as "performing manual tasks," the Court singles out "walking, see-
ing, [and] hearing." 98 The Court seems to be seeking a bright line test for
eligibility, and blindness, deafness and the inability to walk provide a
clear standard.
In stark contrast, the description of carpal tunnel syndrome from
which the respondent suffered seems to trivialize the diagnosis without
regard to her specific condition. 99 The Court reiterates its claim that
Congress limited the ADA's scope to the 43 million it considered dis-
abled.100 If only those unable to see, hear or walk are presumptively dis-
abled under the ADA and thus protected by Title I, then the number of
those considered disabled in 1990 would only have been approximately
3.22 million.'0 ' Clearly, Congress intended to protect a broader class of
people. Even so, Sutton and the other cases from the 1999 term had nar-
rowed the scope of ADA coverage to the extent that no Justice dissented
to the similar standard proposed in Williams.0 2
95. Id. at 196.
96. Id. at 191.
97. See id. at 191-96.
98. Id. at 195.
99. Id. at 199.
While cases of severe carpal tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and
extreme sensory deficits, mild cases generally do not have either of these effects and cre-
ate only intermittent symptoms of numbness and tingling. Studies have further shown
that, even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one
month, but that in 22 percent of cases, symptoms last for eight years or longer .... Given
these large potential differences in the severity and duration of the effects of carpal tunnel
syndrome, an individual's carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indi-
cate whether the individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Id.
100. Id. at 197.
101. According to Chiang, Bassi & Javitt there were 1,103,600 legally blind Americans in
1990. Prevalence of Vision Impairment: National Estimates, at Lighthouse International: Statistics
on Vision Impairment, at http://www.lighthouse.org/vision-impairment.prevalenceolder.htm (last
viewed Oct. 10, 2004). In 1990, 552,000 Americans were unable to hear or understand speech.
Prevalence and Characteristics of Persons with Hearing Trouble: United States, 1990-1991: Series
10: Data from the National Health Survey, No. 188, at Table C, available at U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, http:/Iwww.cdc.gov/nchs/datalsefies/sr_10/srIO_188.pdf (Mar. 1994).
There are 1,564,000 people in the United States using wheelchairs. National Health Interview
Survey on Disability (NHIS-D)for 1994, at Table 1, available at National Center for Health Statis-
tics, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhisdis/ad292tbl.htm (last viewed Oct. 10, 2004).
102. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 184.
[Vol. 82:1
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4. Chevron v. Echazabal
10 3
The second major ADA case of the October 2001 term is Chevron
v. Echazabal. Like Williams, it was a unanimous decision and reinforced
the narrowing of ADA protection.' °4 However, instead of raising the
standard for disability qualification, Echazabal gives employers greater
latitude to fire or deny employment on paternalistic grounds. 05 That is,
if the employer determines that employment poses a risk to the disabled
employee, it has discretion to dismiss the employee. 10 6  Mr. Echazabal
was diagnosed with a liver disease which could have been exacerbated
by continued employment at a Chevron petrochemical refinery. 0 7 Upon
the advice of his doctor, Mr. Echazabal determined that his potential
health risk was minimal and decided to continue in his job. 0 8 Chevron
fired Mr. Echazabal due to the potential risk to his health on the basis of
EEOC regulations which were interpreted to allow a threat-to-self de-
fense. 1°9
Echazabal created a new catch-22 for people with disabilities.
While it had been earlier decided that qualified persons with disabilities
who require accommodations are not afforded ADA protection if such
accommodations are not reasonable (i.e. demonstrating disability status
provides grounds for dismissal or failure to hire),"l0 employers may also
terminate or fail to hire a person whose disability poses a potential risk to
him or herself even if no accommodation is requested."' While the
ADA was enacted to prevent employer paternalism in the form of dis-
crimination, the Court reasoned that the threat-to-self defense reflected a
different and acceptable form of paternalism. 112
This decision is problematic to the extent that it is at odds with the
goals of integration and self-determination, but it provides a bright line
rule to protect employers who would assume known risks to employees,
particularly when such personal injury risk might not be waivable. The
unanimity of the Court implies that it is willing to allow paternalism in
the name of judicial efficiency so long as it does not appear overly dis-
criminatory.
103. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
104. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 73.
105. D. Aaron Lacy, Am I My Brother's Keeper: Disabilities, Paternalism, and Threats to Self,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 55, 84-85 (2003).
106. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 74-75.
107. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000).
108. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
109. Id.
110. Sch. Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (finding that tuberculosis
qualifies as a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act but that the threat of contagion could disqual-
ify an individual from protection).
Ill. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 86.
112. Id. at 85.
BEYOND LANE20041
HeinOnline  -- 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 35 2004-2005
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
5. U.S. Airways v. Barnett113
U.S. Airways v. Barnett addresses the conflict between seniority hir-
ing systems and requests for accommodation. Mr. Barnett was a bag-
gage handler for U.S. Airways until he injured his back. 1 4 He was then
transferred to a mail room position within the company for a period of
time.' 5 However, U.S. Airways decided to make the position available
through its seniority system.11 6 Barnett requested to stay in the position
as a reasonable accommodation of his disability." 7 U.S. Airways argued
that circumventing a seniority system negotiated with labor was not a
reasonable accommodation and fired Barnett. 18 The Court agreed that
this was a valid, though rebuttable, presumption. 19
The most troubling fact in the case is that Barnett's position in U.S.
Airways' mailroom was not a vacant position that the company needed
to fill. 20 Barnett's only request for accommodation was to remain in the
position to which he had been transferred.12 ' However, the rule given by
the Court does give employees with disabilities the opportunity to over-
come the presumption by showing "special circumstances" that make
disregarding a seniority system a reasonable accommodation. 22
The dissents to key portions of the decision are quite different. Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent, in which Justice Thomas joins, rejects the Court's
rule that allows a case-by-case analysis even though it creates a presump-
tion in favor of employers. 23 Justice Souter's dissent is joined by Justice
Ginsburg, and it rejects the notion that seniority rules ought to be insu-
lated from the ADA requirement for reasonable accommodations.1 24 Not
surprisingly, these reactions seem to reflect the expected policy prefer-
ences of the Justices. 25 While Barnett does not fully resolve the compe-
tition between seniority systems and the ADA, it does not represent the
kind of clear erosion of disability rights seen in Sutton or Williams.
113. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
114. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id,
118. Id.
119. Id. at 406.
120. Id. at 423.
121. Id. at 391,423.
122. Id. at 405.
123. Id. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 423-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. See generally Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Deci-
sionmaking, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (2000), and Frederick Schauer, Lecture: Incentives, Reputation
and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000).
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6. Tennessee v. Lane
126
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the ADA is Ten-
nessee v. Lane. The respondents, George Lane and Beverly Jones, are
both paraplegics who use wheelchairs. 127 Lane crawled up two flights of
stairs to make an appearance to respond to criminal charges in a court-
house that had no elevator.' 28 When he returned for a hearing, he refused
either to crawl or be carried to the courtroom and was arrested and jailed
for failure to appear. 129  Beverly Jones, a certified court reporter who
relied on access to courtrooms for her livelihood and was unable to gain
access to a number of county courthouses, joined in the action challeng-
ing the State of Tennessee pursuant to Title II of the ADA.130
Tennessee moved to dismiss the suit at the District Court level on
the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 31 The District Court
denied the motion, and Tennessee appealed the decision to the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 32 The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial
of dismissal on due process grounds. 33 Since the Supreme Court had
ruled in Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett34 that states were im-
mune from Title I liability despite equal protection concerns, some
commentators expected Eleventh Amendment immunity to be extended
to all Title II suits. 35 However, in a 5-4 decision drafted by Justice Ste-
vens, the Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to court access
is a valid justification for Congress' enactment of Title II pursuant to its
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
36
The Court applied the two-part test adopted in Kimel v. Florida Bd.
of Regents137 that requires Congress to unequivocally express its intent to
126. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
127. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1983.
130. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Lane II].
131. Lane 1I, 315 F.3d at 682.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 683. The Circuit Court of Appeals indicates the absence of a factual record in the
District Court opinion. Id.
134. 527 U.S. 356, 364 (2001). Garrett raised the question of the constitutionality of Title I of
the ADA to the extent that it regulates state governments. Id. This ruling relied on a strong interpre-
tation of the II th Amendment according to Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, Garrett, Disability and
Federalism: A Symposium on Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett: The Post-Garrett World:
Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1077-81
(2002).
135. See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Press Release, Supreme Court to Review Americans
with Disabilities Act: Ruling Could Shield States from Anti-Discrimination Suits, at
http:f/www.bazelon.orglnewsroon/1 1-12-03tennv_lane.htm (Jan. 15, 2004); see Memphis Center
for Independent Living Journal, Tennessee v. Lane Oral Arguments: Why Are the Civil Rights of
People with Disabilities a "States Rights" Issue? (stating comments made by disability rights advo-
cates prior to oral arguments for Lane), at http:/lwww.mcil.org/mcilllog2004/O11504sa.asp (Jan. 15,
2004) [hereinafter MCIL].
136. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
137. 528 U.S. 62,73 (2000).
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abrogate state immunity and act pursuant to valid constitutional authority
in rejecting the Eleventh Amendment challenge. 38 Title II itself consti-
tuted unequivocal intent to abrogate immunity, 39 but the question of
valid authority implicated the test in City of Boerne v. Flores,140 which
sets out the standard for permissible remedial legislation in these cases.
The rule allows remedial legislation so long as it is "congruen[t] and
proportional[]" to the threatened injury. 14 1 Given the history and pattern
of discrimination against the disabled and the compelling interest in a
fundamental due process right, the Supreme Court upheld Title II with
regard to states at least in cases involving access to courts.142 It is notclear whether Title H is enforceable against states in other settings. 143
Although Lane is primarily an Eleventh Amendment case, it does
have broader implications for other categories of ADA litigation. It has
sent a signal to the disability rights community that the ADA has not
become a dead letter yet. 44 The majority in Lane includes those Justices
who are typically considered the more liberal members of the Court (Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer), along with Justice
O'Connor, and seems to represent a shift away from the trend toward
narrowing the scope of the ADA, at least with respect to the due process
right to court access. 145 However, it is not clear whether this rule will
apply to Title II suits under any other circumstances.' 46 Such a specific
carve-out may not contribute to greater predictability and efficiency in
ADA litigation, but it does represent a response to facts that demon-
strated an extreme case of the sorts of indignity people with disabilities
have been subjected to in this country-with limited or no legal recourse.
As the clear deciding vote, Justice O'Connor's position is almost cer-
tainly a reaction to this extreme sort of indignity. While not a formalist
in the sense of more conservative members of the Court, among her col-
leagues, Justice O'Connor is among the most consistent supporters of
states' rights. 147 Thus, her decision to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in this case indicates a competing, more important value.
Justices Thomas and Kennedy join Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent.148 In it they dispute the majority's conclusions in applying the
138. Id.
139. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1983.
140. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
141. Id. at 520.
142. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993-94.
143. Id. at 1992-93.
144. See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Press Release, Supreme Court Decides Tennessee
v. Lane and Jones, Upholds Civil Rights Protections for People with Disabilities, at
http://www.bazelon.org/newsroom/5-17-041anedecision.htm (May 17, 2004).
145. See id.
146. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93.
147. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEo. L.J. 491, 548-49 (1997) [hereinafter Klarman 11.
148. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1997 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Boerne test as reaffirmed in Garrett.149 On the sole basis of formalism,
the argument is likely more consistent with Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence than the majority position. Justice Scalia's dissent' 50 objects to
the "congruence and proportionality test" generally as a "flabby" test.15
His concerns are characteristically both pragmatic and textual.
E. The Definition of Disability in the ADA
Disability, as with all categories of disadvantage, contains a wide
variety of expressions. There is cause, time of onset, expected duration,
the severity of impact, the type of impairment and recognizabil-
ity/unrecognizability. 152 These are all valid categories that help to define
with particularity the nature of a given disability. Presumably the spec-
trum of disadvantage ranges from the involuntary, permanent and severe
to the voluntary, temporary and mild. Notably, time of onset and recog-
nizability do not fit neatly within this gradient because they vary depend-
ing on the details of a person's experience and are thus more subjective.
Although there may be inconsistency in the way the ADA is applied
to different groups, the statute itself does not inquire as to the cause or
time of onset of the disability.' 53 Severity and type of disability have
been used as thresholds for recovery. 154 As mentioned earlier, those with
correctable vision problems do not have a claim under the ADA. 155 Al-
though recognizability would play a significant role in determining dis-
crimination cases based on stigma, this factor tends merely to contribute
to the threshold analysis in recent cases.'
5 6
1. Impairment versus Stigma, the Medical versus the Social Model
There are entire classes of people who are stigmatized but do not
have a physical or mental impairment. The impairment classification is
the product of statistics (a characteristic such as height or weight which
is two standard deviations from the mean) or medical pathology.1 57 Dis-
abilities related to height and weight are raised in numerous articles cri-
tiquing the ADA. 158 For example, a boy who produces normal amounts
of growth hormone and is very short, but not so short that he would be
considered to have an impairment based on statistics, might suffer the
same discrimination as a child with a hormonal deficiency, but it is not
149. Id. at 2005-06.
150. Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2008.
152. See Wasserman, supra note 86, at 148-52.
153. See id. at 147.
154. Id. at 147-48.
155. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
156. See Pendo I, supra note 31, at 1224-25.
157. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 149.
158. See Christopher J. Martin, Protecting Overweight Workers Against Discrimination: Is
Disability or Appearance the Real Issue?, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 133 (1994); see also Post, supra
note 39, at 1.
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likely that he would be protected under the ADA. This is an area of in-justice which intuitively might seem to merit protection under the ADA
but does not as it is currently interpreted. This is the situation for many
groups who suffer systematic discrimination due to social stigma rather
than as a direct cause of impairment. 59
Although the discussion of stigma raises serious questions of jus-
tice, it seems to address the issue of discrimination generally, rather than
disability as it is commonly understood. The ADA was never intended
to protect all people from all forms of discrimination. Even so, its lan-
guage and legislative history make it clear that Congress intended to ad-
dress disability as a social construct-not simply as a medical phenome-
non.
160
2. A Different Standard for States: Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Title II of the ADA expressly prohibits discrimination by state and
local governments on the basis of disability with regard to employment,
public programs, activities, and services. 161 In Garrett, the Supreme
Court struck down the provisions of Title I with regard to state govern-
ments as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment, a federalism provision
granting states immunity to federal claims brought by private parties. 162
This case is consistent with a series of cases decided over the past twelve
years that have breathed new life into the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments.163 This reinvigorated federalism has reasserted the sovereignty of
states and has limited previously accepted federal power over certain
local issues. 64 It is unlikely that the ADA would have been found un-
constitutional on these grounds at the time of its adoption. There is no
significant debate that Congress intended for the rights of the disabled to
improve access to employment and freedom from discrimination to have
greater significance than state interests in discriminating.' 65  However,
the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity results in the denial of
Title I protection for disabled employees of state governments, including
instrumentalities of state governments.
A major factor underlying this result is that state discrimination on
the basis of disability receives only rational basis review under the Equal
159. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 148-50.
160. THE ADA OF 1989 Cal. No. 216: COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RES., S. REP. No. 101-
115, at 15-16 (1989).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2004).
162. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 ('The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XI)).
163. Note, The Irrational Application of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett, and Congressional
Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2146, 2147 (2001).
164. William Claiborne, Supreme Court Rulings Fuel Fervor of Federalists, WASH. POST, June
28, 1999 at A2.
165. See generally Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1978.
[Vol. 82:1
HeinOnline  -- 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 40 2004-2005
BEYOND LANE
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;166 therefore, discrimi-
nation is constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 67 Because such classifications are generally con-
stitutional, and because Congressional action abrogating state immunity
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be congruent and
proportional to a constitutional violation, 168 it is difficult (though as Lane
demonstrates, not impossible) for Congress to bar state-sanctioned dis-
ability-based discrimination. While the ADA claims constitutional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the Fifteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected this claim to the extent that
legislation infringes on the legitimate authority of the states unless there
has been a clear demonstration of discrimination by states themselves
providing a specific due process justification. 69 The Supreme Court has
ruled that this is not the case with Title I of the ADA.
70
Garrett exempts states from suits brought under the employment
provisions of Title I, but it does not address the question of liability un-
der Title II. At least one federal circuit court has found that the rule in
Garrett would apply to Title H1 claims. 7 1 While this is reasonable with
regard to Garrett, a similar Supreme Court ruling applicable to Title II
could have completely invalidated the title. Thus with one relatively
narrow ruling on the basis of federalism, the Court paved the way for
completely gutting Title II. Since the disabled rely heavily on programs,
activities, and services largely administered by state governments, strik-
ing down Title H would have a profound impact on the disabled by re-
moving the one direct cause of action against states they currently have
based on discrimination. 172 Although Lane saved Title H from extinc-
tion, it only found a constitutional basis for Title H in the very narrow
issue of access to courts.
3. The Catch-22 of Employment Cases
For those who are not employed by states or state entities, Title I
claims may still be brought; however, these claims have been mostly
unsuccessful when litigated. 73 Statistics on cases brought under the
ADA are not necessarily indicative of the strength of the Act unless they
include data on cases that are settled through administrative channels or
166. Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism and a Court with an Eccentric Mission, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 31, 106 (2001).
167. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1976).
168. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
169. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000).
170. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80-83.
171. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
172. National Council on Disability, Policy Briefing Paper: Tennessee v. Lane: The Legal
Issues and the Implications for People with Disabilities, September 4, 2003 at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroor/publications/200311egalissues.htm (Sept. 4, 2003).
173. See SUSAN MEZEY, DISABLING INTERPRETATIONS: THE ADA IN FEDERAL COURTS
(forthcoming U. of Pittsburgh Press 2005) [hereinafter MEZEY].
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otherwise prior to litigation. 114 That said, Title U cases tend to be moresuccessful than Title I cases when litigated.'
The problem that has arisen is that plaintiffs must show actual dis-
ability in the form of physical impairment even with correction by medi-
cation or device in order to make a claim under Title I, but once they
have established that claim, employers are allowed to terminate employ-
ees because they do not have the requisite physical ability or qualifica-
tion. 176 Thus, an employee is forced to "emphasiz[e] all the things he or
she cannot do in order to claim ADA protection, and then, once through
the courthouse door, [downplay] limitations in order to prove he or she is
qualified for the job."'177
As a practical matter, it would seem that employers will take advan-
tage of this inconsistency whenever possible. Plaintiffs are effectively
insulated from this rule only in cases where the claim is based on a
clearly identifiable condition traditionally associated with physical,
rather than developmental, disabilities such as blindness, hearing im-
pairment, paraplegia, etc. Based on repeated references by the Court to
these three categories, 178 it is likely that judges are likely to presume
ADA protection for those who have paradigmatic disabilities such as
blindness, deafness or paraplegia even if the discrimination suffered is no
different than that suffered by those who do not have such impairments.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGMS
ADA cases and their complex patchwork of rules are in some meas-
ure the result of conflicting philosophical paradigms. 179 Here, philoso-
phy generally means ethics in the broad sense of identifying and making
choices that promote "the good. 1 80 Though similar, it is distinct from
morals, which are narrower, more personal, and less concerned with
teleology.1 8 Undoubtedly, the Court must give a nod to formalism by
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing Disability in the Context of Antidis-
crimination Law, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE
LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 126, 129 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
Routledge 2000).
177. Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court's Nearsighted View of the ADA,
in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 124, 124-25 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
Routledge 2000).
178. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1978 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 195;
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502.
179. See generally Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disability Discrimination Policy-25
Years, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2000); see generally Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substan-
tially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based
Discrimination, 234 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 (2004) [hereinafter Pendo 11].
180. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1698 (Merriam-
Webster Inc. 1993) (defining "philosophy" as "the study of the principles of human nature and
conduct.").
181. Id. at 1468 (defining "morals" as "based on inner conviction.").
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providing a precedential basis for its decisions. However, after Bush v.
Gore'82 it is impossible to deny that Supreme Court decisions reflect the
underlying values of the individual Justices. 183 While it is simple enough
to categorize the basis for decisions as partisan, the ADA cases seem to
indicate that competing ethical systems may motivate the decisions of
individual Justices differently in different cases. We would expect these
sorts of decisions to be more likely in cases on the margins, those with
facts that are shocking or unusual. Clearly there is a tension between the
judicial impulse to create coherent and consistent rules that are predict-
able and efficient and the impulse to provide just solutions within the
framework of legal tradition.
A. The ADA as an Expression of Rawlsian Justice
The ADA was drafted in the shadow of Title VII and related civil
rights legislation and addressed questions of distributive justice that may
be understood within the context of the philosophy of John Rawls
1 84
The philosophy of John Rawls is most thoroughly described in his A
Theory of Justice.185  Rawls posits that justice must fundamentally be
fairness. 186  He proposes that rational persons not knowing the circum-
stances into which they were born would choose a system in which they
would be in the best possible position if they were born into disadvan-
tage. 187  That is, if we knew that we might be born into a marginalized
group, whether discriminated 'against on the basis of class, race, ethnic-
ity, gender, religion, orientation or disability, we would choose a system
that would provide opportunities comparable to those who were not dis-
advantaged. The ADA attempts to move closer to such a system in its
combination of antidiscrimination and accommodation provisions.
182. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the competing paradigms see Jack
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1441-
1458 (2001).
183. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore through the Lens of Constitutional His-
tory, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001) [hereinafter Klarman III.
184. See generally Pendo II, supra note 179.
185. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press rev. 1999) [hereinafter Rawls I] (It is significant that the ADA received support as an expres-
sion of distributive justice in the classical liberal tradition. Rawls posited that fair legal rules can be
developed as a social contract negotiated from the "initial position." Id. at 10-11. The initial posi-
tion is a notion similar to the classical "state of nature;" however, it is an artificial position that
requires ignoring the actual state of privilege and/or disadvantage into which one is born. Id. It
assumes that one cannot make a fair decision regarding the distribution of social goods knowing a
priori what advantages or disadvantages he or she will actually be born into. Id. So, in order to
negotiate a fair social contract, we make distributive decisions pretending not to know. Id. This is
called the "veil of ignorance." Id. at 118-23. As opposed to some other theories of social contract,
Rawls' veil of ignorance is thick in that it denies knowledge of any details of life such as gender,
race, ethnicity, intelligence, health, disability, orientation, etc. Id. Presuming human rationality and
risk aversion, Rawls assumes that a person in the original position reasoning behind the veil of
ignorance will choose to live in the best possible situation if born into disadvantage even if it means
sacrificing economic or social privilege if born into advantage.). Id.
186. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT xvi (Erin Kelley ed., 2001) [here-
inafter Rawls I].
187. See generally RAWLS I, supra note 185.
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While this ethical system is reflected in the Act itself and its implement-
ing regulations, justice as fairness has not been a clear ethical basis for
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADA, except perhaps in Abbott
and Martin. In both cases, the Court seems to be motivated to provide
equal access for those considered disabled by combating irrational dis-
crimination or by providing reasonable accommodations, respectively.188
The power of Rawls's theory of justice is most significant with re-
gard to the ADA in creating a consensus regarding policy goals. To that
extent, "justice as fairness" analysis ought to be used in any reconsidera-
tion of the goals of the ADA. 189 However, it is not as useful in develop-
ing rules that efficiently achieve those policy goals. While the ADA
should be scrutinized to discover whether it has achieved the goals set
out by Congress, failure to achieve those goals efficiently demands re-
considering the legal mechanisms of the ADA-not the goals of the
ADA.
B. The Role of Standpoint Theory
Standpoint theory is largely a product of feminist theory, but it has
been adapted by a number of marginalized groups, including people with
disabilities. 190 The core ethical insights of this philosophy are that the
disadvantaged are in the best position to observe and judge the relative
justice or injustice of a system.'9' Concomitant to these ideas is the no-
tion that the disadvantaged ought to have a privileged position in modify-
ing systems in order to make them more just. 192 This position is not nec-
essarily in conflict with a Rawlsian view, which requires that rational
people at least consider what it would be like to be disadvantaged. The
difference is that the Rawlsian social contract is the product of a thought
experiment: "What would life be like if I were disabled, poor, etc.?"
Within standpoint theory, notions of justice are actually defined by the
disadvantaged themselves.
To the extent that the ADA was influenced by the contributions of
people with disabilities (such as Senator Robert Dole), it may be consid-
ered a product of standpoint theory. Since none of the sitting Justices
would likely consider themselves to be disabled, their decisions are
unlikely to be the product of standpoint theory from the point of view of
the disabled. However, some of the Justices admit a high regard for the
view of the disadvantaged even if they are not members of that particular
class. This group would likely include Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter,
188. See Abbott, 524 U.S. at 637; Martin, 532 U.S. at 661-62 (2001).
189. See infra Part V for a detailed discussion.
190. Mahowald, supra note 17 at 211.
191. Id. at 209.
192. Id. at 209-10.
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and Stevens. 193  Some commentators would also characterize Justice
O'Connor as a feminist.
194
Standpoint theory should be considered in any evaluation or revi-
sion of the ADA. Views of the disabled must be considered in the analy-
sis of raw employment data. Empirical studies should be designed to
compare experiences of discrimination and well-being since the enact-
ment of the ADA and similar state provisions. Also, in refining our pol-
icy approach to the antidiscrimination and participation goals of the
ADA, the voices of people with disabilities must be seriously considered.
This is also true in a Rawlsian analysis of the ADA.
C. Pragmatism in Narrowing Coverage
All nine members of the Court are driven by pragmatic concerns for
judicial consistency and clarity to varying degrees.195 The fact that im-
portant cases limiting ADA protection such as Williams were decided
unanimously 196 seems to indicate a concern for efficiency over fairness in
individual circumstances. From Sutton onward, the Court has denied
protection to people who might otherwise be considered disabled be-
cause it views the class of qualified persons with disabilities as necessar-
ily limited-first, because Congress itself numbered the disabled in the
United States at 43 million' 97 and second, because the costs would be
excessive if ADA protection were given to everyone who wears
glasses' 98 or has carpal tunnel syndrome. 99 This is a position defended
by Justice Scalia as evidenced by his dissent in Lane and his position on
many other ADA cases.'00
Of course, the Court must distinguish between disabilities that cre-
ate major impairments requiring accommodations and those that do not
in order to all6cate limited economic resources. However, broad applica-
tion of the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA does not necessarily
193. These Justices tend to be considered sympathetic to feminist perspectives at least in part
because of their ruling on abortion rights cases. See, e.g., Patricia Dreher & Mindy Davis, After 30
Years of Roe v. Wade: We Won't Go Back!, at http://www.now.org/nnt/fall-2002/roe.htnl (Jan. 22,
2003). "Four justices who can be counted on to vote for reproductive freedom and against most
restrictions on abortion: Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, David Souter and John Paul Ste-
vens." Id.
194. Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J.
891, 895 (1995).
195. Klarman II, supra note 183, at 1723.
196. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
197. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
198. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
199. Toyota 534 U.S. at 199.
200. See e.g., PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 6661 (2001); Lane, 123 S. Ct. at 3; Wright v.
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Veskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998);
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); U.S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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impose additional costs on employers. 20 1 Pragmatism, including but not
limited to neoclassical economics, offers powerful analytical tools for
achieving particular goods. However, it is not as helpful in identifying
the justice goals of our society.2 °2
D. Formalism and States' Rights
Formalism is an awkward basis for judicial decision making. On
the one hand, it is the dominant view of the Langdellian revolution in
legal education which still dominates American law schools and influ-
ences many judges.2 °3  On the other hand, legal scholars and average
citizens find it patently obvious that judges make decisions based on
their personal preferences and cloak those decisions with an aura of for-
malism-particularly on the margins and in difficult cases.20 4 That said,
those judges typically considered conservative seem to rely more heavily
on formalism, as in Rehnquist's dissent in Lane.2°5 Critical scholars
might point out that conservative jurists are more likely to rely on for-
malism because it reinforces the status quo, even though that status quo
may be rife with unfairness.
206
One result of formalist decisions in ADA cases is the upholding of
Eleventh Amendment state immunity. This is particularly noticeable in
Garrett, but it is also evident in most Title II cases with the notable ex-
ception of Lane. Although the Court has made it fairly clear that equal
207protection claims will not abrogate state immunity, perhaps Lane will
open the door to state liability under Title II for due process claims other
than the denial of access to the courts.
201. While there are persuasive intuitive arguments that the threat of litigation increases firing
costs, there is empirical evidence indicating that hiring disabled employees can provide businesses
with competitive advantages. Furthermore, accommodations are usually unnecessary and tend to be
inexpensive when they are necessary. See Peter D. Blanck, Studying Disability, Employment Policy
and the ADA, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW
FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITTrrIONS 209, 212 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds.,
Routledge 2000).
202. Pendo I, supra note 31, at 1205-08.
203. See Michael Ariens, Modem Legal Times: Making Professional Legal Culture, 15 J. OF
AM. CULTURE 25, 25-26 (1992).
204. Klarman I, supra note 183, at 1734-35.
205. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1999 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's failure to
document state due process violations in the legislative record was a formal reason that the majority
opinion in Lane was an invalid exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power).
206. Michael Ashley Stein, Market Failure and ADA Title 1, in THE AMERICANS wITH
DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS
193, 196 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000) (noting that the status quo
is "designed by an empowered majority that has already absorbed existing prejudices and made them
endogenous to future decision making").
207. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1983; id. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist clarifies that Title I claims based on equal protection grounds would be subject to the
same rational base standard applied to Title I claims in Garrett. Id. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
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E. Virtue Ethics in Reaction to Extremes
Virtue ethics 208 has grown in influence as a reaction to both Kantian
deontology and postmodern fragmentation.2 09 It is teleological in that it
looks toward an ultimate good, which in the case of a legal system would
be justice.21 Virtues21! can be imitated by individuals and are ultimately
reflected within the community. 2  Just individuals contribute to the
creation of a just society. While emulable virtues may come from a vari-
ety of sources, many virtue ethicists rely heavily on the Nicomachean
Ethics of Aristotle, even today.213 A virtue ethics analysis of disability
law is likely to address the facts of legal dispute rather than the rules. If
a result does not seem just, however defined, it is not likely to be just.
This is a possible explanation for Justice O'Connor's decision in Lane,
among other controversial decisions. Forcing a man who cannot walk to
crawl up two flights of stairs for a court appearance has an air of moral
unconscionability. It is the kind of thing that does not occur in a just
society, and no amount of formalistic gymnastics can make it just.
208. Virtue ethics concerns "the virtues themselves, motives and moral character, moral
education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of
happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of
what sort of person I should be and how we should live." Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries
ethics-virtue/#l (last mod. Jul. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Virtue Ethics].
209. Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 97, 97-99 (2002)
[hereinafter Huigens].
There is a third major tradition in philosophical ethics, rooted in the writings of Aristotle
and revived recently under the name of virtue ethics. The philosophical tradition of virtue
has nothing to do with the rigid adherence to moral duty advocated by conservatives in
our ongoing culture wars. In its proper, technical sense, the word virtue refers to a capac-
ity for sound practical judgment, both on the occasion of action and in the assembly and
maintenance of one's system of ends and standing motivations. Virtue ethics as a phi-
losophical enterprise focuses its inquiry on normative governance at the level of motiva-
tion-as opposed to duty as dictated by reason, or prescriptions for optimal social wel-
fare.
Id.
210.. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 244, 244-55 (U. of Notre Dame Press, 2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter MACINTYRE 1] (discussing how virtues seek to define an "ultimate good," al-
though asserting that individualism can create competing views).
211. Virtue Ethics, supra note 208.
A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or
generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a 'desirable' or 'morally valuable'
character trait. It is, indeed a character trait-that is, a disposition which is well
entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say 'goes all the way down', unlike a
habit such as being a tea-drinker-but the disposition in question, far from being a single
track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-
track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional
reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and
sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex
mindset.
Id.
212. MACINTYRE I, supra note 210, at 191-193.
213. Virtue Ethics, supra note 208. "[Allmost any modem version [of virtue ethics] still shows
that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy." Id.
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Alasdair Maclntyre proposes that virtue ethics can define a standard
of care for people with disabilities to which we should aspire. 14 He ar-
gues that this standard ought to inform our legal rules, including the
ADA. 15 Since we all depend upon the care of others, in childhood and
old age at the very least, we ought to be able to discern our obligation to
care for others.216 This, Maclntyre understands in the context of human
interdependence rather than benevolence owed to the unfortunate by the
fortunate.217 Though the goals may be different, the process of rooting a
standard of care in Aristotelian virtues in this case may resemble Rawl-
sian analysis to the extent that it requires one to be other-directed. Of
course, for Rawls this is an act of rational self-interest.
The challenge of legal decisions influenced by virtue ethics is that
they could lead to inconsistent or unintelligible doctrines when applied
only in cases with outrageous facts. This is a plausible explanation for
the patchwork of rules around the ADA, but it might not be the case if
virtue ethics were better integrated into judicial decision making. Per-
haps the most significant problem with relying on virtue ethics in a plu-
ralistic culture such as the United States is that there is little broad con-
sensus regarding what such virtues as justice actually require.
IV. IDENTIFYING VERSUS ACHIEVING THE GOOD
With the increased use of empirical studies by legal scholars and the
growing influence of law and economics on both scholarship and policy,
it is not surprising that a number of studies have been conducted to ob-
jectively measure the impact of the ADA in the lives of the disabled.21 8
Unfortunately, there is serious disagreement about the methodology,
usefulness, and conclusions of these studies.2 19 It is conceivable that the
ADA has created more problems than it has solved; however, even if
there is ultimately a consensus that the ADA has failed, an unlikely and
highly disputed possibility, the failure of particular policy mechanisms
must be distinguished from the goal of achieving social goods (the
lowering of irrational discrimination and providing greater opportunities
for the disabled).
214. Alasdair MacIntyre, The Need for a Standard of Care, in THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 81,
81 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000) [hereinafter Maclntyre II].
215. Id. at 82.
216. Id. at 83.
217. Id. at 84.
218. See generally infra notes 220, 221, 226, 227 and 228.
219. Peter Blanck, Lisa Schur, Douglas Kruse, Susan Schwochau & Chen Song, Calibrating
the Impact of the ADA's Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 289 (2003) [here-
inafter Blanck, et. al ].
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A. Empirical Analysis
There are now a number of major empirical studies of the ADA's
impact on employment. Despite the initial optimism following the pass-
ing of the ADA, studies conducted by Thomas DeLier220 and Daron
Acemoglu and Joshua D. Angrist 221 seem to indicate that the ADA actu-
ally resulted in a decline of disabled employment. DeLeir used Survey
of Income and Program Participation ("SIPP") data for men aged eight-
een to sixty-four,222 and Acemoglu and Angrist used Current Population
Survey ("CPS") data for men and women between twenty-one and fifty-
eight years of age.223 DeLeire concludes that the ADA led to a 7.2%
decrease in the probability that a disabled man would be employed start-
ing in 1990, with no corresponding increase in wages. 224 Acemoglu and
Angrist found similar drops in employment probability, but not until
1992.225 The discrepancy in findings raises questions regarding both
methodology and reliability.
Contrary results were reached by John Bound and Timothy Waid-
226 2mann 6 and by Douglas Kruse and Lisa Schur.227 Looking at the same
SIPP and CPS data, these scholars attribute the decline in employment
probability to changes in federal disability benefits and health status.228
Christine Jolls argues that the decline may be accounted for by demon-
strated increases in the rate of disabled adults seeking education and em-
ployment training, presumably with the intention of obtaining new or
better employment. 229 Thus, the drop in the early 1990's was actually a
positive response to the ADA to the extent that those with disabilities
suddenly expected a greater return on investment in human capital.230
There are still a number of problems with these studies. The most
important methodological issue is that the data relied on does not use the
narrow definition for "disabled" from ADA jurisprudence. 231  Further-
220. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 694 (2000) [hereinafter DeLeire].
221. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The
Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON 915, 917 (2001) [hereinafter Acemo-
glu & Angrist].
222. DeLeire, supra note 220, at 698.
223. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 221, at 917.
224. Deleire, supra note 220, at 705.
225. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 221, at 929.
226. JOHN BOUND & TIMOTHY WAIDMANN, ACCOUNTING FOR RECENT DECLINES IN
EMPLOYMENT RATES AMONG THE WORKING-AGED DISABLED (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7975, 2000).
227. Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA,
42 INDUS. REL. 31-66 (2003) [hereinafter Kruse & Schur].
228. CHRISTINE JOLLS, IDENTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
USING STATE-LAW VARIATION: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE ON EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION
EFFECTS I (Am. Law and Econ. Assoc. Ann. Meeting, Working Paper 62, 2004), available at
http://law.bepress.coff/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=alea [hereinafter JOLLS 1].
229. Id.
230. Id. at 9.
231. Kruse & Schur, supra note 227, at 40-45.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 49 2004-2005
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
more, even discounting other external factors, the ADA would have rela-
tively little impact on employment levels in states that had comparable
protections in place before the passage of the ADA.z32
As a partial response to this problem, this paper proposes a new
empirical project to obtain data from those who would clearly qualify as
disabled under the ADA, particularly in states which had no comparable
state antidiscrimination statute before 1990. Ideally the target group
would consist of people who are unable to see, hear or walk, with a likely
presumption of disability under the ADA, from Arkansas, Mississippi
and Alabama (the states without prior protections),233 and between the
ages of thirty-four and sixty (those who would have been of working age
at least two years prior to the passage of the ADA).
B. Discrimination and Accommodation
The employment provisions of the ADA serve both as antidiscrimi-
nation and accommodation measures. 234 Civil rights legislation designed
to combat the effects of irrational discrimination also provided a cause of
action for discriminatory hiring and firing practices as well as granting
hiring preferences.2 35 Given perfect markets, it is true that irrational dis-
crimination ought to disappear because it is not efficient.236 However,
there remains clear evidence of irrational discrimination against people
with disabilities in the labor market.237 So, the ADA and related legisla-
tion effectively provides incentives for employers to overcome discrimi-
nation. These are primarily negative incentives in the form of mandatory
regulatory compliance and the threat of litigation. Accommodation,
however, is a cost borne at least initially by employers, intended to en-
able people with disabilities to compete in terms of worker efficiency.
Ideally, with reasonable accommodations, qualified people with disabili-
ties can compete with non-disabled employees, dispelling assumptions
that might perpetuate irrational discrimination. However, placing the
cost burden on employers could have the unwanted consequence of en-
couraging discrimination.
Christine Jolls argues that antidiscrimination and accommodation
measures in the ADA actually serve overlapping and complementary
roles.238 Legislation intended to lower taste-based discrimination 239 and
232. JOLLS I, supra note 228, at 2.
233. Id. at ll.
234. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.REv. 642, 645
(2001) [hereinafter Jolls II].
235. Id. at 697-98.
236. Gary Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-40 (Univ. Chicago Press, 2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter Becker].
237. Marjorie Baldwin & William Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination against Men with
Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 1-19 (1994).
238. Jolls 1I, supra note 234, at 698.
[C]ertain aspects of antidiscrimination law-in particular its disparate impact branch-
are in fact accommodation requirements. In such instances it is hard to resist the conclu-
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to provide fair opportunities to a historically disadvantaged class must
address the deeper causes of selective unemployment such as the lack of
education and job training.24 ° Ultimately, reasonable accommodation has
been required because it is essential if we are to achieve the goal of equal
participation in society by people with disabilities, in the tradition of the
Rawlsian ideal. Although the cost of reasonable accommodations may
limit the number of people who might otherwise benefit from the antidis-
crimination protection of Title I, accommodations are an essential ele-
ment in overcoming irrational discrimination.24 1
C. Incentives
Historically, the greatest negative incentives in the employment of
the disabled are discrimination and the lack of reasonable accommoda-
tions. There is insufficient incentive to invest in human capital through
education or vocational training if there is no hope for a reasonable re-
turn, particularly if accepting employment requires sacrificing disability
assistance. 242 In response, the ADA creates an accommodation require-
ment and a cause of action against discriminating employers as negative
243incentives to discourage discrimination. Although the antidiscrimina-
tion portion of this policy may be helpful, the accommodation provision
diverts employer resources that could be used to hire qualified people
with disabilities who require little or no accommodation. 244 Employer
costs increase, and the ADA is to blame.
Thus, it is imperative that positive incentives remove some of the
cost burden from employers. The clearest incentives are tax deductions
for the cost of accommodations. 245 To the extent that these are one-time
sunk costs, employers who have made accommodations would have ac-
cess to a broader labor market, including people with disabilities for
which they have already accommodated, making these employers more
competitive. Technological improvements make it more likely that ac-
sion that antidiscrimination and accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamen-
tally distinct categories, despite the frequent claims of commentators to the contrary. The
overlap between the two categories, I suggest, also sheds light on the question of Con-
gress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws (such as the
FMLA) that expressly mandate the provision of particular employment benefits directed
toward specific groups of employees.
Id.
239. The economic dynamic of irrational discrimination, a "taste for discrimination," was
described by Gary Becker in The Economics of Discrimination. Becker, supra note 236, at 39-40.
240. See JOLLS I, supra note 228, at 1.
241. Jolls 1I, supra note 234, at 698.
242. Peter Blanck, et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Prelimi-
nary Study of Entrepreneurship in Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1583, 1639-40 (2000) [hereinafter Blanck,
et al. II].
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2004).
244. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 221, at 920-23.
245. 26 U.S.C.A. § 190 (2004).
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 51 2004-2005
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
246commodations will be scalable within a business. On the employee
side, positive incentives, including access to education and job training,
are crucial, especially for those who did not invest in human capital be-
fore the ADA. 47
D. The Need for Meaningful Data
Congress has made the goal of combating discrimination and pro-
viding meaningful opportunities for the disabled to participate in the la-
248bor market and society a national goal. This is an acknowledged good
that legislation such as the ADA is intended to achieve. However, there
is no point in enforcing rules that do not further this goal. Detailed stud-
ies on the impact of legal incentives on the employment opportunities of
people with disabilities are critical for modifying current legal rules or
proposing new ones. It is encouraging that a body of literature has de-
veloped in the last four years that takes these issues seriously. However,
if antidiscrimination and inclusion are still national goals, we must con-
sider broadening the protections of the ADA to the extent originally ex-
pressed by Congress. Further studies will help provide a more rational
basis for changes in disability law.
V. BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE ADA
The enactment of the ADA represented an ethical decision on the
part of Congress to provide greater access, opportunity, and protection to
people with disabilities. The language of the ADA itself makes the
elimination of discrimination a clear national mandate. 249 To the extent
that courts, including the Supreme Court, have limited the application of
the ADA and frustrated this goal, Congress ought to amend the ADA to
create clearer and more efficient rules for countering discrimination
against the disabled. Since discrimination as defined by the Act is rooted
in the social response to the disabled rather than the physical impairment
itself, ADA rules ought to more clearly address the stigma associated
with disability in attempting to reduce irrational discrimination. Any
proposed changes ought to address distributive justice concerns, the
246. Heidi M. Berven and Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the ADA Part I1- Patents and
Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 85-89, 96
(1998).
247. Blanck, et al. L supra note 242, at 286.
248. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1984 (2004).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2004).
It is the purpose of this chapter-(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to pro-
vide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with dis-
abilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the ma-
jor areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
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ramifications of increased litigation, state immunity problems and the
catch-22 created by Sutton.
A. Legislation Defining Disability as Stigma
In order to be relevant and effective, the ADA requires significant
changes, drafted within the context of disability law, but which would
unequivocally apply to anyone discriminated against on the basis of so-
cial stigma associated with disability. Such legislation should require
courts to consider the social model originally intended by Congress.
Philosophically, this position emphasizes broader protections from dis-
crimination based on differences that are consistent with a Rawlsian
point of view.
Congress needs to make it clearer that those covered by sections
3(2)(B) and (C) of the current ADA,people with a history of a disability
or perceived as having a disability,2 are intended beneficiaries of this
legislation. There should be clear examples of the kinds of people who
should be protected from discrimination listed in the Congressional Re-
cord---even if their conditions do not constitute a physical impairment
according to the medical model or if their conditions are managed with
drugs such as for epileptics or diabetics. To be absolutely clear, the pro-
posed changes would create a new category consisting of those who are
discriminated against due to the stigma of actual, historic, or perceived
disability. It is unfortunate that judicial activism has circumvented legis-
lative intent to the extent that the plain meaning of a statute is simply
reconstrued 2 but it requires that Congress express its intentions with
greater precision. Since any piece of legislation consists of a bundle of
compromises, this kind of clarity can be difficult to achieve, but the al-
ternative is to cede legislative authority to the courts, which seems to
have happened in ADA cases.
B. Distributive Implications
Broadening the protections of the ADA, or disability legislation in
general, might adversely impact the severely disabled who are among the
powerless described by Justice Ginsburg. With regard to accommoda-
tion, the ADA is an unfunded mandate (with the exception of subsidies
in the form of tax credits) and institutions need only make reasonable
accommodations. Thus, if more employees of a company could make
claims for accommodation, the pool available for the severely disabled as
currently understood would be reduced. It might be argued that that dis-
tribution could be prioritized. However, such an arrangement would
require a bright line test, could default to the current standard of impair-
250. This is true at the very least in the case of 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(C) of the ADA which
does not require actual impairment.
251. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(B) (2004).
252. Center & Imparato, supra note 13, at 322.
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ment, and would leave few, if any, resources for the newly covered. The
argument that there are limited resources is reinforced by the fact that
even now most challenged claims are denied.253
While these objections have validity with regard to the provisions
that require access to special services or require employers to make ex-
pensive accommodations, it would be possible and appropriate to limit
the scope of the ADA to preventing discrimination for those who make
claims based on stigma alone rather than actual impairment. After all, if
there is no actual impairment, there should be no need for accommoda-
tion. All of the arguments raised rely on the assumption that those pro-
tected by antidiscrimination provisions require accommodations. If we
do not grant accommodation to those claiming discrimination due to
stigma alone, there will be no accommodation costs. As with the Civil
Rights Act, aggressive distributive justice measures like affirmative ac-
tion and accommodations can be handled separately from the core anti-
discrimination provisions even though they serve overlapping functions.
C. Litigation
Drafting statutes requires line-drawing, and it is commonly under-
stood by legislators that bright line standards are most efficient. They
are admittedly arbitrary, but they establish that certain categories of peo-
ple are not intended to be covered. The medical standard typically used
in ADA litigation may appear to be more objective, but it is subjective in
that it requires a physician's opinion. There is significant evidence to
indicate that medical diagnosis fails as a truly objective standard in liti-
254gation. Ultimately, proving stigma may be no more subjective than
proving impairment.
It may be argued that a standard of individual impact due to stigma
would open the courthouse doors to mountains of potential claims by
"short, fat, homely people, ' 255 and that without clear standards, litigation
would become more time consuming and more expensive. There is
probably some truth to this claim. If we expand the protection of the
ADA, there will likely be more litigation. However, it must be noted that
Congress intended to cover those who are perceived to be disabled in the
original ADA, so technically such claims were litigable before. Fur-
thermore, if preventing injurious, unjustified discrimination is a goal of
our justice system, then litigation is an inevitable consequence of legisla-
tion that would further that goal as in the Civil Rights Act.
253. MEZEY, supra note 173.
254. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECrED BODY 117-138 (NY: Routledge 1996).
255. Wasserman, supra note 86, at 154.
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D. How to Overcome the Federalism Problem
The issue of federalism is the most problematic for the ADA, as the
response to Lane in both the majority and the dissents may indicate. 6 if
the Supreme Court has determined that Congress has no legal authority
to enact such legislation, then amendments will inevitably fail.
First, the legislative history and preamble to any new legislation
should more clearly document historical patterns of discrimination
against the disabled in both the private and public sectors. If a clear pat-
tern of discrimination is shown, the Court might be more willing to up-
hold restrictions on states as employers under equal protection and due
process rights other than access to courts.
Second, Congress could define qualified disabled persons as mem-
bers of a class requiring stronger protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As long as states can discriminate based on any "rational
basis," the current standard, there will be relatively little protection for
the disabled. While Congress may not have the power to designate a
suspect class for purposes of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court is
beginning to analyze discrimination cases on a more individualized basis,
257recommending proportional responses. This is particularly true in
light of Lawrence v. Texas.258 If Congress were to clearly identify pat-
terns of discrimination that justify a stronger federal response, the courts
would be under more pressure to enforce the legislation as written, even
if a new suspect class were not created for Fourteenth Amendment pur-
poses.
E. Solving the Catch-22
Here, distinguishing between stigma, with or without actual im-
pairment, and impairment alone is significant. With regard to discrimi-
nation, the key issue is stigma. The Supreme Court may have been rea-
sonable in concluding that those who have relatively minor correctable
vision problems are not "disabled" in the sense intended by the ADA.
Actual impairment still raises valid issues of accommodation and access,
256. MCIL, supra note 135.
This case is important not just because it threatens to gut the ADA, preventing millions of
people with disabilities from enforcing their rights, but also because it is the latest attack
in an aggressive campaign by extremist conservatives in recent years to weaken federal
civil rights protections for all Americans, under the notion of states' rights," said Nancy
Zirkin, deputy director and director of public policy at the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, a leading national civil rights coalition.
Id.
257. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003).
258. Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
945, 996 (2004). The Court in Lawrence overturned the state power to criminalize sodomy estab-
lished in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) on due process grounds. While the standard
used by the Court does not resemble intermediate or strict scrutiny, neither does it appear to be a
simple rational basis standard. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-579 (2003).
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and those cases could be litigated under different auspices than pure dis-
crimination claims. If someone with hypertension or diabetes is -stigma-
tized in some way, then they should receive protection from discrimina-
tion based on that stigma whether the condition is corrected by medica-
tion or not. If an employer makes irrational decisions based on preju-
dices regarding a person's health and perceived disability, there should
be a remedy under the ADA as originally drafted. The fact that a condi-
tion is correctable by prosthesis, device or medication does nothing to
eliminate the irrational bias and discrimination. Separating distributive
justice measures linked with impairment and antidiscrimination concerns
associated with stigma would eliminate the catch-22 in those cases in
which it seems most illogical.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our comprehensive approach to disability must distinguish between
cases that address functional issues of access based on impairment and
discrimination issues based on stigma. This would return us to the social
model apparently intended by Congress, at least with regard to discrimi-
nation cases, and would mitigate the catch-22 problem.z59
New legislation must be clearly drafted to unequivocally and strate-
gically define the categories of those who should be protected under the
ADA as well as demonstrate a clear history of discrimination against the
disabled. Legislation must aggressively address the challenges to Con-
gressional authority posed by recent Supreme Court cases within the
framework of those decisions in the context of federalism.
The ADA was intended to promote justice for the disabled. It has
become a model for many nations.260 Unfortunately, the reach of the
ADA has been gradually eroded by court decisions. Perhaps without
even intending it, the Supreme Court has created a legal framework that
is filled with contradictions and denies justice to the intended beneficiar-
ies of the legislation. If the ADA is not amended, its effectiveness as an
antidiscrimination law will likely continue to diminish, even if cases
such as Lane occasionally enforce its provisions in narrow circum-
stances.
259. Pendo I, supra note 31 at 1226.
260, Jerome E. Bickenbach, The ADA v. the Canadian Charter of Rights: Disability Rights and
the Social Model of Disability, in THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILITIES ACT: EXPLORING
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 354 (Notes) (Leslie Pickering
Francis & Anita Silvers eds., Routledge 2000). A number of nations have enacted legislation mod-
eled on the ADA, including Australia (Disability Discrimination Act, 1992), the United Kingdom
(Disability Discrimination Act, 1995, c 50), New Zealand (Human Rights Act, 1993, No. 82), India
(Disabled Persons Act), and Israel (Disabled Persons Act, 1998). Id.
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